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The Ontology of MindEvents, Processes, and States$
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Helen Steward

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250647

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.001.0001

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Events, Particularity, and Properties

Events, Particularity, and Properties

Chapter:
(p.18) (p.19) 1 Events, Particularity, and Properties
Source:
The Ontology of Mind
Author(s):

Helen Steward

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.003.0002

This chapter considers two theories of events which connect the category of event quite closely to the category of property by utilizing the notion of a property exemplification. Both Jaegwon Kim and Jonathan Bennett have defended views according to which events are exemplifications of properties; and though there are significant differences between the two accounts, both share the thought that events relate to properties not merely by having them, in the ordinary way in which anything which is characterizable in any manner at all can be said to have properties, but in a special way, whereby the event is deemed to be something whose identity is actually tied to some particular property (Kim) or to a collection of properties (Bennett). It is argued that views of this sort result in a conception of events on which they have really ceased to have any status as genuine particulars. Kim's events despite his frequent claim that they are particulars, are better classified as fact-like entities. And Bennett relies illicitly on a particularist conception of events in order to develop his anti-particularist theory of what they are, so that his view ultimately founders in incoherence.

Keywords:   Jaegwon Kim, Jonathan Bennett, philosophy of mind, events, property

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