Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
OccasionalismCausation Among the Cartesians$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Steven Nadler

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250081

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 06 April 2020

Louis de la Forge and the Development of Occasionalism: Continuous Creation and the Activity of the Soul

Louis de la Forge and the Development of Occasionalism: Continuous Creation and the Activity of the Soul

Chapter:
(p.123) 7 Louis de la Forge and the Development of Occasionalism: Continuous Creation and the Activity of the Soul
Source:
Occasionalism
Author(s):

Steven Nadler (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0009

This chapter considers some implications of an important argument for occasionalism used by La Forge (and Malebranche). If God, as La Forge’s “continuous creation” arguments runs, is required to continually sustain finite substances in existence, and if this sustenance must extend to the modes or properties of such substances, then it would seem to follow that La Forge is no more entitled to attribute real causal powers to the mind than to the body. The conclusion is that the use of this argument commits a philosopher to a more thorough going occasionalism than he may initially intend.

Keywords:   occasionalism, La Forge, Malebranche, mind, body, God, creation, causation, substance, modes

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .