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OccasionalismCausation Among the Cartesians$
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Steven Nadler

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250081

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.001.0001

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Knowledge, Volitional Agency, and Causation in Malebranche and Geulincx

Knowledge, Volitional Agency, and Causation in Malebranche and Geulincx

Chapter:
(p.74) 4 Knowledge, Volitional Agency, and Causation in Malebranche and Geulincx
Source:
Occasionalism
Author(s):

Steven Nadler (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0006

Some occasionalists argue that there is an epistemic or cognitive condition for causality, whereby in order to count as the cause of an effect one must know how to bring that effect about. Finite minds do not have the knowledge necessary to move bodies, the argument runs; only God, as an omniscient mind, can adequately fulfill this condition. This unusual epistemic condition for causal power appears primarily in the arguments of Malebranche and Geulincx, which are examined in this chapter.

Keywords:   cause, knowledge, Malebranche, Geulincx, occasionalism, God, mind, body

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