Many philosophers and theologians who are themselves religious see religious experiences as completely non-cognitive and hence useless as evidence for anything beyond the subject's own psychological states. This view is usually bound up with a radically demythologised or non-realist picture of religious language. In order to investigate religious experience as evidence for something beyond purely autobiographical claims, it is important to defend the presupposition that religious experiences and religious utterances can and ought to be treated as capable of having cognitive content. This chapter examines the views of those who are sympathetic to religion and who yet maintain that religious utterances are not intended to be factual assertions. The role of models and metaphors in describing religious experience is also discussed.
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