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Philosophy Psychiatry and NeuroscienceA Synthetic Analysis of the Varieties of Human Experience$
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Edward M. Hundert

Print publication date: 1990

Print ISBN-13: 9780198248965

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.001.0001

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From Objectivity to Ontology

From Objectivity to Ontology

Chapter:
(p.36) 2 From Objectivity to Ontology
Source:
Philosophy Psychiatry and Neuroscience
Author(s):

Edward M. Hundert

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0003

This chapter shows Hegel's criticism of Kant's metaphysical world as being ‘merely objective’. Hegel's critique of Kant's view of knowledge is simply that it is self-refuting. To this self-refuting view, Hegel proposes a solution which eliminates the gulf between things-as-we-know-them and things-in-themselves. Hegel is acutely aware that the relationship between the ‘moment of knowledge’ and the ‘moment of truth’ is not always that of identity. The great irony contained in Kant's conception of the relationship between ‘thoughts’ and ‘things’ is that he seemed so much more interested in the contribution of thoughts to things. While Kant put forth the (self-refuting) view that reality is ‘relative to’ consciousness, Hegel replaces this with the ultimately unobjectionable view that reason is relative to reality.

Keywords:   Hegel, metaphysical world, self-refuting view, knowledge, truth

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