Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Metamind$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Keith Lehrer

Print publication date: 1990

Print ISBN-13: 9780198248507

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 11 November 2019

Induction, Rational Acceptance, and Minimally Inconsistent Sets

Induction, Rational Acceptance, and Minimally Inconsistent Sets

Chapter:
(p.96) 4 Induction, Rational Acceptance, and Minimally Inconsistent Sets
Source:
Metamind
Author(s):

Keith Lehrer

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.003.0005

This chapter presents a theory of inductive inference and rational acceptance in scientific enquiry. A concept of relevant deduction is defined as a concept in which the truth of each and every premise of a deductive argument is essential to establishing the truth of the conclusion by deduction from the premises. This definition is based on the completely abstact notion of a minimally inconsistent sets of statements. In terms of this same abstract logical concept and the relation of probability, this chapter designs a concept of inductive inference that is a principle of rationality. This concept of inductive reference is shown to form the basis of a principle of acceptance in which two important epistemic utilities are maximised.

Keywords:   inductive inference, rational acceptance, relevant deduction, inductive rule, induction, explanation

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .