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Keith Lehrer

Print publication date: 1990

Print ISBN-13: 9780198248507

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.001.0001

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Metaknowledge: Undefeated Justification

Metaknowledge: Undefeated Justification

Chapter:
(p.251) 11 Metaknowledge: Undefeated Justification
Source:
Metamind
Author(s):

Keith Lehrer

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.003.0012

This chapter concerns a very traditional question and two modern theories that constitute answers. The traditional question is ‘what must be added to true belief to yield knowledge?’, which is often referred to as a Socratic question. Some philosophers would deny that belief is a condition of knowledge and would reject the question as resting on a false presupposition. Belief may not be the propositional attitude that is required. It is clear, however, that if truth is a condition of knowledge, then some affirming attitude toward what is true is also a condition of knowledge. There are two answers to the question that are both important but which are argued by this chapter to be incorrect. They have come to be called ‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’.

Keywords:   belief, knowledge, internalism, externalism, metaknowledge, undefeated justification, informed prejudice objection, invincibility objection

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