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Keith Lehrer

Print publication date: 1990

Print ISBN-13: 9780198248507

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.001.0001

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The Coherence Theory of Knowledge

The Coherence Theory of Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.226) 10 The Coherence Theory of Knowledge
Source:
Metamind
Author(s):

Keith Lehrer

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.003.0011

The analysis of knowledge embedded in the theory is traditional in form but not in content. It is in the tradition of undefeated justified true belief analyses. The salient character of the theory of knowledge is contained in the theory of justification, which is the intersection of the subjective, the mental operations of the knower, and the objective, the truth about reality. The coherence theory of justification on which the coherence theory of knowledge rests effects the truth connection and explains the intersection between the mind and the world. The explanation depends on people's conception of themselves as trustworthy with respect to some matters is some circumstances, and untrustworthy about other matters in other circumstances. If people are as trustworthy as they think they are, then acceptance is justified.

Keywords:   theory of knowledge, justification, mental operations, coherence, acceptance, reasonableness, probability, causal theory, reliability, convergence

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