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Passage and PossibilityA Study of Aristotle's Modal Concepts$
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Sarah Waterlow

Print publication date: 1982

Print ISBN-13: 9780198246565

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246565.001.0001

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‘Always’ and ‘Necessarily’ in De Caelo I.12

‘Always’ and ‘Necessarily’ in De Caelo I.12

Chapter:
(p.49) IV ‘Always’ and ‘Necessarily’ in De Caelo I.12
Source:
Passage and Possibility
Author(s):

Sarah Waterlow

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246565.003.0004

This chapter examines the use of ‘always’ and ‘necessarily’ in De Caelo I.12. From here, it takes ‘necessarily’ and ‘impossible’ as meaning ‘necessarily/impossible in the strongest sense’. Meanwhile, ‘always’ is meant without restriction. Aristotle was not necessarily inconsistent in maintaining B' as a rational position even at a time when he denied one of the assumptions essential to the De Caello proof. The Physics analysis of ‘infinite’ is proof only if ‘always’ and ‘for an infinite time’ are made synonymous.

Keywords:   always, necessarily, impossible, Hintikka, infinite time

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