Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Passage and PossibilityA Study of Aristotle's Modal Concepts$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Sarah Waterlow

Print publication date: 1982

Print ISBN-13: 9780198246565

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246565.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 January 2020

Aristotelian modality (II)

Aristotelian modality (II)

(p.31) III Aristotelian modality (II)
Passage and Possibility

Sarah Waterlow

Oxford University Press

This chapter deals with two questions not yet considered. First, it looks at the logical relation between the relative temporized conditions (RT-conditions) and their corresponding results that justifies an inference from the former to the latter. This extends to the modal expressions appearing in the results. They express concepts which Aristotle has explained by the claim that their application is determined by the RT-conditions. Unless the results are validated generally from the conditions, the modal concepts in the former embody a fallacy and must be regarded as incoherent. Second, it examines the modal concepts employed in the RT-conditions employed in the conditions themselves. In each condition, there is a reference to‘impossible’ consequences, and to these consequences as ‘following’ or ‘not following’. By ‘following’ Aristotle means a connection such that premises necessarily imply the conclusion.

Keywords:   RT-conditions, categorical, following, modal concepts, impossible consequences, RT-results

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .