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On What There Must Be$
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Ross Harrison

Print publication date: 1974

Print ISBN-13: 9780198245070

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245070.001.0001

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(p.118) CHAPTER FIVE Perception
On What There Must Be

Ross Harrison

Oxford University Press

The next question to be considered is whether the general model world at its present second level of necessity or austerity contains some feature which means that it is impossible for a world just of sensations to be a comprehensible one. This question is obviously of central importance to many theories and worries about perception. It also derives the feature that it must be possible for the protagonist to be in error in some of his present tense judgements about the world. It is hoped that establishing this feature will form an intermediate step in the derivation of the impossibility of a world consisting just of sensations, and so this feature will be dubbed the intermediate feature. In addition, the consequences of the possibility of error in present judgements are presented. The chapter also covers the formal argument for same conclusion. Next, it explores the phenomenalism and knowledge by acquaintance. The desired conclusion that a world just of sensations would not be a comprehensible one has therefore finally been reached.

Keywords:   perception, judgements, phenomenalism, general model world, protagonist, error

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