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On What There Must Be$
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Ross Harrison

Print publication date: 1974

Print ISBN-13: 9780198245070

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245070.001.0001

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Connection of Judgements

Connection of Judgements

(p.51) CHAPTER THREE Connection of Judgements
On What There Must Be

Ross Harrison

Oxford University Press

This chapter describes the connection of judgements. It first addresses informal argument. As a premiss, it ultimately depends upon assumption and agreement, and the first premiss is introduced and used as an unsupported premiss. It is indicated that a fundamental feature of any comprehensible world is that the protagonist (of that world) should be able to make some distinction between those judgements that he could make which would be true (or apply to the world), and those judgements that he could make which would be false (would not apply to the world). The historical use of the first premiss is reported. Leibniz took his philosophy as resting on two premisses or principles, the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. In addition, immediate deductions from the first premiss, laws, the case where the protagonist is always right, and the alternative premisses are covered.

Keywords:   judgements, informal argument, premiss, comprehensible world, Leibniz, protagonist, laws

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