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Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism$
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D.C. Stove

Print publication date: 1973

Print ISBN-13: 9780198245018

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.001.0001

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The Falsity of its Deductivist Premiss

The Falsity of its Deductivist Premiss

(p.74) 6 The Falsity of its Deductivist Premiss
Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism


Oxford University Press

This chapter covers the falsity of its deductivist premiss. Deductivism is one of the premisses, and, in this chapter, it tries to show that it is false. The chapter also illustrates that the currency of deductivism is deep, wide, and long. The arguments for deductivism are then reported. In addition, the chapter presents some arguments against deductivism. The nature of the deductivist thesis and its specific content impose restrictions on the range of possible arguments for it. They similarly impose restrictions on the range of possible arguments against it.

Keywords:   deductivist premiss, deductivism, falsity, arguments, deductivist thesis

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