Using a very small number of methodological assumptions, this chapter retraces the intuitive motivation for the theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs). One tenet of the work is that the theory of PRPs, is part of logic. Specifically, it is part of natural logic, i.e., logic in the broad sense that includes the logic of natural language as a part. The chapter defends this tenet and argues, in particular, that the best representation of intensionality in natural language is provided by a first-order intensional language that is just like a first-order extensional language except that it is fitted out with an intensional abstraction operation.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.