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The book was planned and written as a single, sustained argument. But earlier versions of a few parts of it have appeared separately. The object of this book is both to establish the existence of the paradoxes, and also to describe a non-Pascalian concept of probability in terms of which one can analyse the structure of forensic proof without giving rise to such typical signs of theoretical misfit. Neither the complementational principle for negation nor the multiplicative principle for conjunction applies to the central core of any forensic proof in the Anglo-American legal system. There are ... More

*Keywords: *
probability,
forensic proof,
non-Pascalian concept,
Anglo-American legal system,
complementational principle,
negation,
multiplicative principle,
conjunction

Print publication date: 1977 | Print ISBN-13: 9780198244127 |

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011 | DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244127.001.0001 |

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## Front Matter

## Part I Can there be a Non-Pascalian Concept of Probability?

## Part II Six Difficulties for A Pascalian Account of Judicial Probability

## Part III The Elements of Inductive Probability

## Part IV Some Applications of Inductive Probability

## End Matter

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