- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The Problem for a Polycriterial Theory of Probability
- 2 Probability as Gradation of Provability
- 3 The Completeness Issue
- 4 What are the Standards of Proof in Courts of Law?
- 5 The Difficulty about Conjunction
- 6 The Difficulty about Inference upon Inference
- 7 The Difficulty about Negation
- 8 The Difficulty about Proof beyond Reasonable Doubt
- 9 The Difficulty about a Criterion
- 10 The Difficulty about Corroboration and Convergence
- 11 The Case against a Mathematicist Account of Judicial Probability
- 12 The Foundations of Inductive Logic
- 13 The Grading of Inductive Support
- 14 The Logical Syntax of Inductive Support-gradings
- 15 The Incommensurability of Inductive Support and Mathematical Probability
- 16 The Grading of Inductive Probability
- 17 The Logical Syntax of Inductive Probability-gradings
- 18 The Assessment of Judicial Proof
- 19 Resolution of Six Difficulties for a Mathematicist Account of Judicial Proof
- 20 Criteria of Merit for Explanations of Individual Events
- 21 Statistical Explanation
- 22 Criteria of Rational Belief
- 23 Dispositions
- 24 An Epistemological Corollary
- Index

# The Difficulty about Inference upon Inference

# The Difficulty about Inference upon Inference

- Chapter:
- (p.68) 6 The Difficulty about Inference upon Inference
- Source:
- The Probable and The Provable
- Author(s):
### L. Jonathan Cohen

- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press

This chapter explores the difficulty about inference upon inference. Where a proof in a civil case involves several tiers of inference, the courts normally insist that each tier prior to the final one should rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, a mathematicist analysis would permit many multi-tier inferences to go through even though each tier was proved merely on the balance of probabilities. So this kind of analysis has to suppose that the courts' requirement here springs from a special legal rule. But the rationale of such a rule is obscure if the mathematical analysis is correct. On the other hand, the courts' requirement here does jibe with common-sense ideas about chains of inference.

*Keywords:*
inference, proof, mathematicist analysis, probabilities, courts, mathematical analysis

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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The Problem for a Polycriterial Theory of Probability
- 2 Probability as Gradation of Provability
- 3 The Completeness Issue
- 4 What are the Standards of Proof in Courts of Law?
- 5 The Difficulty about Conjunction
- 6 The Difficulty about Inference upon Inference
- 7 The Difficulty about Negation
- 8 The Difficulty about Proof beyond Reasonable Doubt
- 9 The Difficulty about a Criterion
- 10 The Difficulty about Corroboration and Convergence
- 11 The Case against a Mathematicist Account of Judicial Probability
- 12 The Foundations of Inductive Logic
- 13 The Grading of Inductive Support
- 14 The Logical Syntax of Inductive Support-gradings
- 15 The Incommensurability of Inductive Support and Mathematical Probability
- 16 The Grading of Inductive Probability
- 17 The Logical Syntax of Inductive Probability-gradings
- 18 The Assessment of Judicial Proof
- 19 Resolution of Six Difficulties for a Mathematicist Account of Judicial Proof
- 20 Criteria of Merit for Explanations of Individual Events
- 21 Statistical Explanation
- 22 Criteria of Rational Belief
- 23 Dispositions
- 24 An Epistemological Corollary
- Index