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ExperiencesAn Inquiry into Some Ambiguities$
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J. M. Hinton

Print publication date: 1973

Print ISBN-13: 9780198244035

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.001.0001

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Perception-illusion disjunctions: general

Perception-illusion disjunctions: general

6 Perception-illusion disjunctions: general

J. M. Hinton

Oxford University Press

This chapter states that by way of what is seen as an essential, very special, philosophical notion of an experience, here it concerns itself with a type of proposition to be called perception–illusion disjunction. It suggests that even if few things are certain, it is certain that there are perception–illusion disjunctions. A perception–illusion disjunction mentions the illusion of the very perception it mentions. It is perhaps surprising that perception–illusion disjunctions are not more often deliberately placed in the centre of the picture, in the philosophy of perception. Philosophers do quite often introduce the notion of an experience-report as that of a statement, or even the statement, which is true both when one perceives a given thing and when one has the illusion of doing so. This makes it sound as if they had in mind a perception–illusion disjunction. One has only to ask them whether they do, to find that they do not.

Keywords:   notion, experience, perception, illusion, perception–illusion disjunctions, statement

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