This chapter discusses empiricism referring, among other things, to unremarkable experiences, of a sort which the author cannot help believing to be so extremely common that it would be ridiculous to call them common experiences. It states that sense-experiences have an ‘inner’ quality quite independently of any quality which is conferred on them by experience. One way of getting clear about a notion is to contrast it with another, particularly one that is expressed by the same word or phrase. The relevant special notion of an experience contrasts, among other things, with a certain more general biographical notion of an experience, which some would indicate by the definition as an event of which one is the subject. An experience, in some special sense of the word, would of course not necessarily be debarred from being an experience in that very general biographical sense as well.
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