Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Development of Ethics: Volume 1From Socrates to the Reformation$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Terence Irwin

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780198242673

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242673.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 February 2020

Scotus: Virtue and Practical Reason

Scotus: Virtue and Practical Reason

Chapter:
(p.679) 26 Scotus: Virtue and Practical Reason
Source:
The Development of Ethics: Volume 1
Author(s):

TERENCE IRWIN

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242673.003.0026

John Duns Scotus believes that since freedom depends on will rather than intellect, and since virtuous action is (as Augustine says) the good use of free will, the will is also the subject of the moral virtues. If the moral virtues belonged to the passions or to the intellect, they would not be subject to free will, and so we would not be open to praise or blame for being virtuous or vicious. If the will is the subject of the moral virtues, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas are wrong to make the passions the subjects. Scotus rejects Aristotle's view that assigns the virtues to the sensory appetite rather than to the will. Though he rejects the view that he ascribes to Aristotle, Scotus also believes that Aristotle sometimes treats the will as the subject of the virtues. Scotus argues that every moral virtue requires a good habituated state in the will no less than in the sensory desires.

Keywords:   John Duns Scotus, freedom, free will, intellect, moral virtues, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, passions, desires

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .