Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
An Introduction to Bradley's Metaphysics$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

W. J. Mander

Print publication date: 1994

Print ISBN-13: 9780198240907

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240907.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 October 2019

Subject and Predicate

Subject and Predicate

(p.57) 3 Subject and Predicate
An Introduction to Bradley's Metaphysics

W. J. Mander

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines F. H. Bradley's view of the nature of thought and why it is so different from reality. In calling thought abstract or universal, Bradley wishes to bring to the fore the fact that it is essentially divisive. Thought works by taking reality and carving off, or abstracting, some aspect from it. For Bradley, no system of thought can ever be identical with reality. The consequence of this situation is that no thought in principle can ever be wholly and ultimately true. Bradley tries to demonstrate this fact by showing that the pluralist or relational way of thought is unavoidably subject to internal incoherence and self-contradiction. As such, he claims it could never be adequate, or true of reality. The subject-predicate schema is to be found in two separate but parallel forms—that is, as a thesis about the nature of thought and as a thesis about the nature of reality. Bradley argues against both of these.

Keywords:   F. H. Bradley, philosophy, metaphysics, logic, thought, reality, subject, predicate, grammar

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .