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Metaphor and Moral Experience$
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A. E. Denham

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198240105

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.001.0001

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Metaphor and Judgements of Experience

Metaphor and Judgements of Experience

Chapter:
(p.280) 9 Metaphor and Judgements of Experience
Source:
Metaphor and Moral Experience
Author(s):

A. E. Denham

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.003.0010

Experience can be difficult to describe and hence requires the use of figurative devices such as metaphors and similes. This chapter argues that figurative language sometimes succeeds in representing aspects of experience which resist characterisation in literal terms. According to the Inexpressibility Thesis, the truth-conditions of some metaphors can not be represented by terms contained in the strictly literal lexicon (of a given language). By proposing a special category of phenomenological metaphors, this chapter offers an account of metaphor that both explains and supports the Inexpressibility Thesis. It also examines non-cognitivism and reductionism, metaphor and experience-dependent concepts, two models of similarity judgements, and phenomenological metaphors.

Keywords:   metaphor, experience, judgements, figurative language, Inexpressibility Thesis, phenomenological metaphors, non-cognitivism, reductionism

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