Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Good and the True$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Morris

Print publication date: 1992

Print ISBN-13: 9780198239444

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 December 2019

A Proposal for a Scientific Metaphysics

A Proposal for a Scientific Metaphysics

Chapter:
(p.54) 5 A Proposal for a Scientific Metaphysics
Source:
The Good and the True
Author(s):

Michael Morris

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0006

The condition of factual equivalence for reduction determines what it is for two expressions for the same object, property, or fact. Informative metaphysical explanations cannot be conceptual equivalence. Two expressions for the same things may nevertheless express different concepts or ways of thinking. The same thing can be thought of in different ways. Frege suggests that a particular way of thinking of an object is characterized by a particular kind of epistemological access to that object. This chapter discusses knowledge constraint and that it may be rejected by some on the grounds that it is verificationist or more generally anti-realist. Lastly, this chapter argues that we cannot insist that the direction of explanation be the same for all metaphysical explanations.

Keywords:   factual equivalence, reduction, informative metaphysical explanations, conceptual equivalence, Frege, epistemology, knowledge constraint, verificationist, anti-realist

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .