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Epistemic InjusticePower and the Ethics of Knowing$
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Miranda Fricker

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780198237907

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001

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The Virtue of Testimonial Justice

The Virtue of Testimonial Justice

(p.86) 4 The Virtue of Testimonial Justice
Epistemic Injustice

Miranda Fricker (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter develops an initial account of a virtue to counteract the ever-present risk of doing testimonial injustices: the virtue of testimonial justice. The hearer who possesses this virtue reliably neutralizes the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements. Naïve and corrective forms of the virtue are distinguished. Issues of culpability are explored and the historical conditions under which one might be non-culpable in perpetrating a testimonial injustice. A distinction between routine and exceptional judgements is made and related to the question of moral relativism.

Keywords:   blame, luck, moral relativism, prejudice, credibility judgements

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