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Epistemic InjusticePower and the Ethics of Knowing$
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Miranda Fricker

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780198237907

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001

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Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony

Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony

Chapter:
(p.60) 3 Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony
Source:
Epistemic Injustice
Author(s):

Miranda Fricker (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.003.0004

This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, and a proposed account of epistemically virtuous perception that the virtuous hearer possesses owing to a well-trained testimonial sensibility. He perceives his interlocutor as more, or less, credible in what she is telling him.

Keywords:   non-inferentialism, virtue epistemology, moral cognitivism, testimonial sensibility

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