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Epistemic InjusticePower and the Ethics of Knowing$
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Miranda Fricker

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780198237907

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001

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Prejudice in the Credibility Economy

Prejudice in the Credibility Economy

(p.30) 2 Prejudice in the Credibility Economy
Epistemic Injustice

Miranda Fricker (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter defends an account of stereotypes, according to which stereotypes are (reliable or unreliable) widely-held associations of an attribute(s) and a social group. A conception of prejudice is advanced and put together with the foregoing to produce a definition of prejudicial stereotype. It is argued that (reliable) stereotypes are an essential heuristic in the making of credibility judgements in testimonial exchanges. There is, however, an ever-present risk that the stereotypes on which we rely are prejudicial, producing testimonial injustice. The wrong of testimonial injustice is analysed: someone is undermined in their capacity as a giver of knowledge.

Keywords:   stereotype, credibility judgement, social imagination, social construction, testimonial injustice

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