Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Without Good ReasonThe Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Edward Stein

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198237730

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237730.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 October 2019

The Standard Picture

The Standard Picture

Chapter:
(p.214) 7 The Standard Picture
Source:
Without Good Reason
Author(s):

Edward Stein

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237730.003.0007

According to the standard picture of rationality, there are normative principles of reasoning, and these principles are (at least, for the most part) what we think they are; that is, they stem from principles of logic, probability, and the like. There are three arguments why human rationality might be a conceptual matter, which address themselves to the normative principles of reasoning. The first claims that relativism is true for the norms of reasoning; the second claims that the norms of reasoning are dependent on our reasoning competence; and the third claims that we have no access to the norms of reasoning. This chapter argues that although none of these arguments successfully undermines the irrationality thesis, they do not leave the standard picture of rationality unscathed. It also considers a serious alternative to the standard picture of rationality, dubbed the naturalized picture of rationality.

Keywords:   standard picture, rationality, logic, probability, normative principles, relativism, reasoning competence, irrationality, naturalized picture

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .