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Without Good ReasonThe Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science$
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Edward Stein

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198237730

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237730.001.0001

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Reflective Equilibrium

Reflective Equilibrium

Chapter:
(p.137) 5 Reflective Equilibrium
Source:
Without Good Reason
Author(s):

Edward Stein

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237730.003.0005

This chapter presents an argument for the rationality thesis which says that human reasoning competence cannot diverge from the normative principles of reasoning because both the normative principles and competence are intimately connected with our intuitions about what constitutes good reasoning. As such, the conclusion of the argument requires interpreting the reasoning experiments as not in fact providing evidence for the irrationality thesis. The chapter deals with both the general version of this argument and a particular version of it that thaws on the epistemological theory of reflective equilibrium. After sketching the general argument and analyzing why it might initially seem plausible, the chapter spells out the reflective equilibrium version of the argument for the rationality thesis. According to the reflective equilibrium argument, the normative principles of reasoning come from our intuitions about what constitutes good reasoning, and our intuitions about what constitutes good reasoning come from our reasoning competence. The chapter argues that norms of grammaticality are indexed to actual facts about human psychology, neurophysiology, and the like, whereas norms of reasoning are not.

Keywords:   rationality, irrationality, reasoning competence, intuitions, normative principles, reflective equilibrium, grammaticality, psychology, neurophysiology

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