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Who Knew?Responsibility Without Awareness$
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George Sher

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195389197

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.001.0001

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Responsibility and Practical Reason

Responsibility and Practical Reason

Chapter:
(p.41) Three Responsibility and Practical Reason
Source:
Who Knew?
Author(s):

George Sher (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.003.0003

This chapter asks what positive reason we might have to accept the searchlight view. Because the searchlight view holds that agents are responsible only for the features of their acts of which they were aware when they deliberated, the chapter examines the hypothesis that that view codifies a conception of responsibility that has its origins in the deliberative perspective. The idea that responsibility is a practical concept has been defended by Christine Korsgaard and Hilary Bok, so the chapter takes its lead from their discussions. Its main conclusions are that the practical approach to responsibility cannot capture the concept's applicability to (1) acts we have already performed and (2) the acts of others.

Keywords:   responsibility, deliberation, practical reason, first person, Christine Korsgaard, Hilary Bok, past acts, acts of others

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