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Collective RationalityEquilibrium in Cooperative Games$
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Paul Weirich

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195388381

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388381.001.0001

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Cooperative Games

Cooperative Games

Chapter:
(p.139) 8 Cooperative Games
Source:
Collective Rationality
Author(s):

Paul Weirich (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388381.003.0008

Players may act jointly to honor a contract that binds them. Cooperative games afford opportunities for joint action, that is, collective action that is causally coordinated by, say, an agreement among the players. For example, bargainers may reach an agreement about a sale price to coordinate their acts. In coalitional games players may form coalitions of individuals who act jointly. A core allocation gives each coalition at least as much as it can obtain on its own. Some coalitional games have no core allocation, however. Hence collective rationality does not require the players in such games to realize a core allocation. A strong Nash equilibrium is such that no coalition has an incentive to deviate from it. Not all coalitional games have a strong Nash equilibrium, so collective rationality does not impose a general requirement to realize one.

Keywords:   bargaining, binding contract, coalitional game, cooperative game, core, core allocation, joint action, strong Nash equilibrium

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