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Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good$
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Sergio Tenenbaum

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195382440

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.001.0001

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On the Guise of the Good

On the Guise of the Good

Chapter:
(p.111) 6 On the Guise of the Good
Source:
Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good
Author(s):

Joseph Raz (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.003.0006

The chapter examines the main argument for, and the presuppositions of the claim that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An analysis of intentional actions, and of action for a (normative) reason, followed by a consideration of a number of objections to the thesis of the Guise of the Good force various revisions and refinements of the thesis yielding a defensible version of it. It is argued that the revised thesis is supported by the same argument that inspired the Guise of the Good from the beginning and that the thesis plays a crucial role in uniting theories of action, rationality, and normativity.

Keywords:   Intention, value, good, reason, Anscombe, Setiya

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