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The Thief of TimePhilosophical Essays on Procrastination$
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Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195376685

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.001.0001

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Prudence, Procrastination, and Rationality

Prudence, Procrastination, and Rationality

Chapter:
(p.99) 6 Prudence, Procrastination, and Rationality
Source:
The Thief of Time
Author(s):

Olav Gjelsvik

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.003.0006

This chapter defends an aspect of the standard view that procrastination is doing things later in time than you should and does so by accounting for normative aspects of time discounting and preference reversals as a result of time’s passing. The possible wrongness of the procrastination-relevant preference reversals is traced to fundamental issues about rationality and particularly about the consistency of preferences, both at one time and over time. The wrongness is related to the wrongness of preference inconsistency. The chapter, in dealing with these normative questions, also addresses some issues about internal and external reasons, as this is needed to account for the normative rightness of consistency.

Keywords:   internal/external reasons, normative aspects of discounting, procrastination, prudence, preference consistency

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