The top‐down and bottom‐up approaches to artificial moral agents emphasize the importance in ethics of the ability to reason. However, much of the recent empirical literature on moral psychology emphasizes faculties besides rationality. Emotions, empathy, sociability, semantic understanding, and consciousness are all important to human moral decision making, but it remains an open question whether these will be essential to artificial moral agents and, if so, whether they can be implemented in machines. This chapter surveys the cutting‐edge scientific investigation in the areas of affective computing and embodied cognition that is aimed at providing computers and robots with the kinds of supra‐rational capacities underlying those social skills which may be essential for sophisticated human‐computer interaction.
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