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Following the RulesPractical Reasoning and Deontic Constraint$
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Joseph Heath

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780195370294

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.001.0001

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Intentional States

Intentional States

(p.99) 4 Intentional States
Following the Rules

Joseph Heath (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter attempts to provide further motivation for the model of deontic constraint proposed in the previous chapter, by filling in some of the background that informs the way that philosophers use the terms “belief” and “desire.” The central difference between rational choice theorists and philosophers, in this regard, is that the latter think of beliefs and desires as propositional attitudes, and thus as fundamentally sentence-like in nature. Adopting this linguistically-informed perspective lends much greater plausibility to the introduction of principles as a third category of intentional state. Support for the view that all intentional states should be thought of as deontic statuses is presented.

Keywords:   linguistic turn, intentional states, private language argument, game of giving and asking for reasons, analytical system, adaptive unconscious

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