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The Philosophy of David Kaplan$
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Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195367881

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881.001.0001

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Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives

Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives

Chapter:
(p.137) CHAPTER 9 Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives
Source:
The Philosophy of David Kaplan
Author(s):

Timothy Williamson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881.003.0009

This chapter argues that Dummett's inferentialist account of pejoratives in natural language is quite mistaken, and provides an alternative account within the framework of referentialist semantics. Little is said explicitly about the overall upshot for the inferentialist‐referentialist debate, the terms of which may be too inchoate for fruitful engagement at that level of abstraction. However, an issue will tentatively be raised about the bearing of pejoratives on another vexed and programmatic debate, that over the relative priority of language and thought.

Keywords:   Dummett, natural language, referentialist semantics, thought

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