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The Philosophy of David Kaplan$
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Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195367881

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881.001.0001

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What Is De Re Belief?

What Is De Re Belief?

Chapter:
(p.233) CHAPTER 14 What Is De Re Belief?
Source:
The Philosophy of David Kaplan
Author(s):

Robert Stalnaker (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881.003.0014

This chapter brings out some of the interconnections between the specific issues about the logical form of de re belief attributions and the broader issues about intentionality. It begins by going over some familiar ground: reviewing the Quine/Kaplan analysis, spelling out the problem that originally motivated it, and considering some different assumptions about the objects or contents of belief. It then looks at Kaplan's modifications of Quine's analysis, and at a way that it might be further generalized, in light of its internalist motivation. The chapter concludes by looking at de re belief, and belief generally, from a contrasting externalist perspective.

Keywords:   intentionality, Quine, Kaplan, belief attributions, de re

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