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Belief about the SelfA Defense of the Property Theory of Content$
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Neil Feit

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780195341362

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001

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THE PROPERTY THEORY AND DE RE BELIEF

THE PROPERTY THEORY AND DE RE BELIEF

Chapter:
(p.117) CHAPTER FIVE THE PROPERTY THEORY AND DE RE BELIEF
Source:
Belief about the Self
Author(s):

Neil Feit (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.003.0005

This chapter considers the property-theoretic account of de re belief, or belief about the various particulars in the environment. The first section discusses David Lewis's view of de re belief. The second section defends Lewis's account from an objection of Thomas McKay's. The third section presents a problem for Lewis's account and a solution from the perspective of the property theory. In the fourth and final section, a few other worries about the notion of de re belief are discussed. The goal of the chapter is to defend a property-theoretic picture of de re belief, which takes the contents of de re beliefs to be self-ascribed properties of a certain kind and is consistent with the internalist picture of the mind developed in the preceding chapters.

Keywords:   de re belief, internalism, Lewis, McKay

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