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Belief about the SelfA Defense of the Property Theory of Content$
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Neil Feit

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780195341362

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001

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ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPERTY THEORY

ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPERTY THEORY

Chapter:
(p.59) CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPERTY THEORY
Source:
Belief about the Self
Author(s):

Neil Feit (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.003.0003

This chapter discusses the main alternatives to the property theory of content. The first section discusses the triadic view of belief. On this view, to believe something is to stand in a triadic relation to a proposition and some other kind of thing (sometimes called a belief state or guise). The second section argues that the triadic view and the property theory are genuine rival theories of psychological content. In the third section, dyadic propositionalism — the view that belief is ultimately just a dyadic relation between a person and a proposition — is reconsidered. Along the way, other theories are discussed, and the property theory is shown to be preferable to each alternative.

Keywords:   belief state, dyadic propositionalism, guise, proposition, triadic view of belief

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