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Belief about the SelfA Defense of the Property Theory of Content$
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Neil Feit

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780195341362

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001

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MENTAL CONTENT AND THE PROBLEM OF DE SE BELIEF

MENTAL CONTENT AND THE PROBLEM OF DE SE BELIEF

Chapter:
(p.3) CHAPTER ONE MENTAL CONTENT AND THE PROBLEM OF DE SE BELIEF
Source:
Belief about the Self
Author(s):

Neil Feit (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.003.0001

This chapter discusses the notion of the content of a cognitive attitude, such as a belief or a desire. According to the doctrine of propositions, the content of such an attitude is always a proposition. The problem posed by de se beliefs for the doctrine of propositions is discussed, and the property theory of content is identified as a competitor to the doctrine of propositions. The chapter concludes with a preliminary defense of an internalist, or individualistic, version of the property theory of content.

Keywords:   attitudes, content, de se belief, individualism, internalism, property theory

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