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Mechanisms of DemocracyInstitutional Design Writ Small$
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Adrian Vermeule

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195333466

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333466.001.0001

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Optimizing Transparency: The Budget Process

Optimizing Transparency: The Budget Process

(p.184) Chapter 6 Optimizing Transparency: The Budget Process
Mechanisms of Democracy

Adrian Vermeule

Oxford University Press

This chapter analyzes transparency in the setting of the national budget process in the United States Congress. It argues for selective transparency, in which some decision-making processes are opaque, and in which some information is disclosed to some constituents at some times but not to others at other times. It suggests that selective transparency should be instituted through a regime of delayed disclosure of legislators' actions, to promote sound legislative deliberation and to liberate legislators from undesirable accountability to narrow interests.

Keywords:   US Congress, selective transparency, federal budget, budget policy

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