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Mechanisms of DemocracyInstitutional Design Writ Small$
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Adrian Vermeule

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195333466

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333466.001.0001

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The Limits of Uncertainty

The Limits of Uncertainty

(p.55) Chapter 2 The Limits of Uncertainty
Mechanisms of Democracy

Adrian Vermeule

Oxford University Press

This chapter indicates the limits of the veil mechanism by discussing three tradeoffs: (1) between impartiality and information; (2) between impartiality and motivation; and (3) between impartiality and ex post enforceability. A heavily veiled government might possess too little information to act effectively. Less intuitively, its officials might lack the motivation to introduce many beneficial projects, and might thus display an insufficient level of activity or energy.

Keywords:   veil rules, tradeoff, impartiality, information, motivation, enforceability

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