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Mechanisms of DemocracyInstitutional Design Writ Small$
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Adrian Vermeule

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195333466

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333466.001.0001

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The Veil of Uncertainty

The Veil of Uncertainty

Chapter:
(p.31) Chapter 1 The Veil of Uncertainty
Source:
Mechanisms of Democracy
Author(s):

Adrian Vermeule

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333466.003.0002

This chapter introduces the veil of uncertainty as a small-scale mechanism for promoting impartiality. The American federal constitution is used as a source of illustrations, with lateral comparisons to other constitutions where useful. It suggests that Congress is subject to more constitutional veil rules, of wider scope, than is the President or the judiciary.

Keywords:   impartiality, constitutional choice, self-interested decision-making, veil rules, veil mechanisms

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