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Beyond ReductionPhilosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science$
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Steven Horst

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195317114

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.001.0001

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The Demise of Reductionism in Philosophy of Science

The Demise of Reductionism in Philosophy of Science

Chapter:
(p.47) 3 The Demise of Reductionism in Philosophy of Science
Source:
Beyond Reduction
Author(s):

Steven Horst (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0004

This chapter examines the widespread assumptions that intertheoretic reductions are common in the natural sciences and that reducibility serves as a kind of normative constraint upon the legitimacy of the special sciences. While this was the mainline view in philosophy of science in the mid‐twentieth century, it has received decisive criticism within philosophy of science since the 1970s. The basic reasons for this rejection of Carnap‐Nagel style reductionism are recounted in this chapter.

Keywords:   Positivism, Logical Empiricism, philosophy of science, reduction, Unity of Science, axiomatic reconstruction, naturalistic philosophy of science

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