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Beyond ReductionPhilosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science$
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Steven Horst

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195317114

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.001.0001

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Cognitive Pluralism and Naturalism

Cognitive Pluralism and Naturalism

Chapter:
(p.199) 10 Cognitive Pluralism and Naturalism
Source:
Beyond Reduction
Author(s):

Steven Horst (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0011

This final chapter returns to the topic of naturalism, exploring the implications of Cognitive Pluralism for naturalism. The answer depends on the type of “naturalism” that is in question. In philosophy of science, naturalism indicates the view that philosophy of science should not proceed through a priori reasoning, but be guided by what is found in the sciences themselves. In this respect, this book has pursued a “naturalistic” approach. However, if naturalism means that the mind can be wholly accommodated in the world of nature as understood by the natural sciences, the conclusions to be drawn are antinaturalistic. Pluralism is antireductionistic. And cognitivism treats the mind as being in a special sense prior to our models of the world, including our scientific models.

Keywords:   Naturalism, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, Cognitive Pluralism, metaphysics, ontology

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