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Rationality and the GoodCritical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi$
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Mark Timmons, John Greco, and Alfred Mele

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195311952

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.001.0001

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Reflections on Reflection in Robert Audi's Moral Intuitionism

Reflections on Reflection in Robert Audi's Moral Intuitionism

(p.19) 2 Reflections on Reflection in Robert Audi's Moral Intuitionism
Rationality and the Good

Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that Audi's views on moral intuitions, specifically concerning whether they can be justified without being based on inference, raise a number of questions Audi has yet to address. First, it asks, can moral intuitions be justified without reflection? Second, does Audi's account of reflection turn out to involve inference? And are conclusions of reflection therefore based on inference? Third, can conclusions of reflection be justified without second-order beliefs concerning the reliability of the reflection? And if not, wouldn't this also involve inference? Fourth, can conclusions of reflection be justified without at least an ability to infer? And if not, wouldn't this leave the view unable to block the skeptical regress?

Keywords:   intuitions, inference, ethics, reflection, inference, skepticism

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