Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The New Unconscious$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman, and John A. Bargh

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195307696

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307696.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 September 2019

Theory of Mind: Conscious Attribution and Spontaneous Trait Inference

Theory of Mind: Conscious Attribution and Spontaneous Trait Inference

Chapter:
(p.277) 11 Theory of Mind: Conscious Attribution and Spontaneous Trait Inference
Source:
The New Unconscious
Author(s):

Angeline S. Lillard

Lori Skibbe

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307696.003.0012

Theory of mind refers to the tendency to construe people in terms of their mental states and traits. An understanding of others' mental states can be described as a theory of mind. The first signs of appreciation of mental states appear very early in young children. Younger children seem cognizant about accidents, goals, and intentions. The very early onset and predictable developmental course of theory of mind abilities has led some to suggest that they are supported by innate processes. One source of support for theory of mind stemming from an innate process is the ease with which normal adults make theory of mind attributions, at least with reference to traits. We even apply folk psychology to inanimate entities like triangles, a clear case of extreme overattribution. The early and automatic deployment of a theory of mind has led to speculation that it stems from an innate process. This innate process could take the form of a module.

Keywords:   theory of mind, mental states, traits, children, goals, intentions, innate processes, attributions, folk psychology, module

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .