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Doing without Concepts$
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Edouard Machery

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195306880

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.001.0001

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Concepts in Philosophy

Concepts in Philosophy

Chapter:
(p.31) 2 Concepts in Philosophy
Source:
Doing without Concepts
Author(s):

Edouard Machery (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.003.0003

This chapter describes what concepts are taken to be in philosophy and identifies the goals of philosophical theories of concepts. Philosophers of concepts attempt to determine the conditions one has to meet to be able to have beliefs and other propositional attitudes about the objects of one's attitudes. The theories of concepts developed by philosophers Jerry Fodor and Christopher Peacocke are examined critically. The chapter undercuts many of the arguments made by philosophers against the psychological theories of concepts.

Keywords:   belief, propositional attitudes, Jerry Fodor, Christoper Peacocke

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