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Morality and Self-Interest$
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Paul Bloomfield

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195305845

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305845.001.0001

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Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism

Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism

Chapter:
(p.205) 10 Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism
Source:
Morality and Self-Interest
Author(s):

Julia Annas

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305845.003.0011

There are problems with egoism as a theory, but what matters here is the point that intuitively ethics is thought to be about the good of others, so that focusing on your own good seems wrong from the start. Virtues are not just character traits, however, since forgetfulness or stubbornness are not virtues. Virtues are character traits which are in some way desirable. Criticism is generally renewed at this point on the grounds that claims about flourishing are now including claims about virtue, and are thus no longer common ground to the defender and the critic of virtue ethics. But virtue ethics has never held that they are, so this is not a problem. It is only to be expected that the virtuous will differ from the nonvirtuous in their assessments of flourishing, because we are dealing here with virtue in the context of a formally characterized conception of flourishing.

Keywords:   egoism, intuitively, virtue, criticism, flourishing

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