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Repeated Games and ReputationsLong-Run Relationships$
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George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195300796

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 August 2019

 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs

 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs

Chapter:
(p.273) 8 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
Source:
Repeated Games and Reputations
Author(s):

George J. Mailath (Contributor Webpage)

Larry Samuelson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0008

This chapter uses the tools developed in Chapter 7 to bound the set of equilibrium payoffs for a repeated game, based on decomposing payoffs on half spaces. These bounds imply a lack of efficiency for games with binding moral hazard. Extensive illustrations are provided, primarily with the prisoners’ dilemma.

Keywords:   binding moral hazard, decomposability, efficiency, half space, payoff bounds

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