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Repeated Games and ReputationsLong-Run Relationships$
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George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195300796

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001

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 Reputations with Long-Lived Players

 Reputations with Long-Lived Players

Chapter:
(p.511) 16 Reputations with Long-Lived Players
Source:
Repeated Games and Reputations
Author(s):

George J. Mailath (Contributor Webpage)

Larry Samuelson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0016

This argument extends the reputation results of the previous chapter to games in which both players are long-lived. The argument here is complicated by the intertemporal incentives that now appear in the choices of the (long-lived) uninformed player. While the results are accordingly somewhat weaker, they again take the form of lower bounds on the payoff of a sufficiently patient long-lived player whose type is subject to some uncertainty. Relatively strong payoff bounds are obtained for games with conflicting interests, games of imperfect monitoring, and games with sophisticated commitment types.

Keywords:   conflicting interests, long-lived players, payoff bounds, reputation, sophisticated commitment type, Stackelberg payoff

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