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Repeated Games and ReputationsLong-Run Relationships$
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George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195300796

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001

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 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Chapter:
(p.329) 10 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Source:
Repeated Games and Reputations
Author(s):

George J. Mailath (Contributor Webpage)

Larry Samuelson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0010

This chapter provides examples in which private strategies, where a player’s behavior can depend nontrivially on his or her own privately observed past action, open up new payoff possibilities that cannot be achieved with public strategies, even though the monitoring is public. Equilibria in private strategies need not have a recursive structure. The chapter shows that belief-free equilibria are nonetheless relatively tractable.

Keywords:   belief-free equilibria, private strategies, public monitoring

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